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of individual essences elsewhere. 5
The AudiIWainwright collection ought to be useful to almost anybody doing
research in philosophical theology. It explores new directions in religious epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, and with greater historical sensitivity than
is often the case in analytic philosophy of religion. It ought to stimulate a great
deal of further work.
NOTES
I. Cr. Alvin Plantinga. "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. 1980.
2. "In Search of the foundations of Theism." Faith and Philosophy. II. 4 (October, 1985), p. 480.
3. "On Taking Belief in God as Basic." delivered at the Institute in Philosophy of Religion.
Bellingham. Washington. summer 1986; also part of Gifford Lectures and Payton Lectures. 1987.
4. A good example is Bernard Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University
Press, 1985.
5. "Individual Essence and the Creation," in Thomas V. Morris. ed .. Divine and Human Action:
Essays in the Metaphysics of Thei.lm, Cornell University Press. 1988.

Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary Debate, by David and Randall
Basinger. (Problems in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 2.) Lewiston, New York
and Queenston, Ontario, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986. Pp. 124. $39.95

Reviewed by WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
This book assesses recent discussions of miracles. David Basinger is primarily
responsible for chapters I and IV and Randall Basinger for chapter Y. The authors
are jointly responsible for chapters II and III.
The Basingers have several controversial theses. Chapter I argues that even
though it makes sense to speak of God directly causing events that are "permanently inexplicable by science," the concept of a violation of natural law is
incoherent. (The Basingers admit that we can coherently talk of divinely caused
nonrepeatable counterinstances to natural laws. They argue, however, that these
shouldn't be called violations since this implies that the laws and the event's
occurrence are formally inconsistent. I doubt whether most theists have used
"violation" this strictly. However, the objections of critics like Flew show that
the term can easily lead to misunderstanding.)
The authors also contend that though one might have sufficient evident that
reported occurrences are incompatible with well established nomologicals
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(chapter II), we wouldn't be justified in concluding that they were permanently
inexplicable by science (chapter III). Chapter IV argues that "while theists may
under some circumstances be able justifiably to affirm, for themselves, that God
has directly intervened, it cannot be argued that conditions exist under which
all theists would be forced to admit that God has directly done so." A fortiori,
no conditions exist under which all people would be obliged to do so. (The
argument of chapter IV heavily depends on that of chapter III. It is largely
because they think we can't rule out the possibility of scientific explanation that
the Basingers doubt the possibility of evidence that would compel all theists to
speak of divine intervention.)
These claims raise serious issues. For example, the Basingers contend that
"as long as seeming counterinstances are not repeatable, the scientist can (and
indeed should) continue to affirm the adequacy of the laws in question while
continuing to search for new or modified laws to accommodate the recalcitrant
events." This seems mistaken. Either there is strong evidence for the nonrepeatability of a seeming counterinstance or there isn't. If there is, the scientist has
excellent reasons for continuing "to affirm the adequacy of the laws in question."
But by the same token, he or she also has excellent reasons for thinking that
the laws can't be revised to accommodate the recalcitrant events. (The Basingers
insist that "only repeatable counterinstances falsify scientific laws," presumably
because scientific laws are only designed to deal with repeatable events.) If, on
the other hand, there is only weak evidence for the occurrence's nonrepeatability,
the scientist should "search for new or modified laws to accommodate" the event.
It is doubtful, however, whether he or she should also "continue to affirm the
adequacy" of the laws to which the event is a seeming counterinstance. (Though
it may be reasonable to still use them.)
The most striking contention is developed in chapter V. Classical theists believe
that God sometimes performs miracles to forestall or mitigate natural evils. But
they also believe His power and goodness are unlimited. Why, then, doesn't
God perform miracles more often? The authors seem to think that classical theists
must answer this question in one of two ways. The "uniformity defense" states
that "if nature is to support and make possible free, moral agents, it must be
characterized, by and large, by [natural] order and uniformity." Natural evil is
an unwanted but unavoidable consequence. Other classical theists think that God
prearranges things so that "events in nature will uniformly and predictably unfold
in correlation" with our actions and choices. On this view, natural evil is an
indirect consequence of people's behavior. Both views explain why miracles
rarely occur. According to the first, frequent miracles are inconsistent with the
uniform operation of natural law. Since the latter is necessary for freedom,
wholesale intervention would result in the loss of a great good. According to
the second, natural evils are appropriate to the psycho-physical, moral and
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spiritual conditions of free agents. Since they are appropriate, their occurrence
isn't evil all things considered. Both views can thus account for the rarity of
miracles. But both have unpalatable consequences.
Why is this the case? (1) The uniformity defense implies that God doesn't
"directly" or "specifically" ordain, or "unilaterally determine," most evils. They
are instead "unwanted but unavoidable by-products of a world which, as a whole,
is good." (2) But if so, "God is not in total control of how nature affects particular
persons" and hence isn't truly omnipotent. (3) The prearrangement hypothesis
protects God's power but destroys the distinction between general and special
providence. All events are responses to "the specific needs [and conditions] of
particular persons." (4) It also implies that evils "flow directly and specifically
from the divine will." (5) And yet if God "is directly responsible for all specific
evils," His goodness is "placed in jeopardy."
I don't find this convincing. For example, 2 seems false. The most that follows
from the uniformity defense is that the evils which result from nature's operations
aren't willed for their own sake or as means to an end (in the strict sense, that
is, as something produced or permitted to bring about a certain result). The evil
which results from nature's operations may be unavoidable but are the Basingers
suggesting that God's power is imperfect if He is unable to achieve certain goods
without permitting evils? If so, most forms of the greater goods defense are in
trouble.
3 seems true only if the prearrangement hypothesis implies that each good
and evil that befalls someone is ordained because it is appropriate to his or her
psycho-physical, moral and spiritual condition. I doubt whether many Western
theists have held this. A more common view, surely, is that while some goods
and evils are of this sort, others are ordained to secure a more general good or
the good of some other person. Only the former are direct responses to "the
specific needs [and conditions] of particular persons."
4 is false if "flowing directly from the divine will" implies "unilateral determination." As the Basingers recognize, on one version of the prearrangement view,
God coordinates events with actions which He foresees but does not determine.
In this version, our actions are partial causes (or conditions) of at least some of
the evils that befall us.
It is also difficult to see the force of 5. As Jonathan Edwards points out, God
is responsible for any evil He could prevent. But in any more or less traditional
form of theism, God can prevent all evil by not creating. He is thus responsible
for it. The authors' point may be that while the uniformity defense makes evils
by-products of God's creative activity, the prearrangement hypothesis implies
that they are deliberately chosen means; His responsibility is thus greater. But
is one less responsible for the foreseen by-products of one's activity than for
one's means? In any case, it isn't clear that even total responsibility endangers
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God's goodness if God has a morally sufficient reason for ordaining or permitting
evil. On the prearrangement hypothesis, He clearly has.
The Basingers' theses are, then, controversial. But their book has several
virtues. Flew and the other philosophers discussed are treated carefully and fairly,
and the authors' arguments are often thought provoking. While I am not convinced
by their contentions, I suspect that many readers of this journal will find some
of them more persuasive than I do.

Knowing the Unknowable God. Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas, by David B.
Burrell, C.S.C. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1986. Pp. x and 130. cl. $15.95.
Reviewed by ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, The Catholic University of America.
This book is a historical and systematic study of the way the Muslim, Jewish
and Christian religious traditions worked together in the middle ages to yield
the theological understanding of God as esse subsistens. In his Introduction,
Burrell observes that the central theme to be addressed is how God and the word
are to be distinguished. As a context for this distinction, he examines, in Chapter
1, an "imaginative scheme" or "background picture" that was shared by Jews,
Christians, and Muslims, a scheme in which all the parts of the cosmos emanated
from a divine source. This picture emphasized the connection between the world
and God and provided "an enveloping tapestry" in which people were able to
locate themselves. Burrell says that Aquinas' emphasis on the otherness of God
worked against this scheme; Aquinas claims that God creates not through intermediaries but directly. In Chapter 2 Burrell discusses Ibn Sina, who is said to
anticipate the full understanding of the distinction between the world and God.
He shows how Ibn Sina modifies the metaphysics of both Alfarabi and Aristotle;
Ibn Sina claims that existence is not a presupposition simply, but that it can be
thought about as something that happens to a thing. Existence becomes an issue.
In this same chapter, Burrell also discusses Aquinas and Maimonides as questioning existence, and he also speaks about the function of the act of judgment
in becoming aware of existence as an issue.
In Chapter 3 he examines Aquinas more closely. One of the best points in
this chapter is the distinction Burrell draws between ordinary properties and
formal properties, those that "are not so much said of a subject, as they are
reflected in a subject's very mode of existing, and govern the way in which
anything whatsoever might be said of that subject" (p. 47). The attributes of
God are formal properties. Here, as in many other passages in the book, Burrell
neatly puts logical themes to theological use. Chapter 4, on the names of God,
concentrates on Maimonides. Burrell tries not only to discuss how it is that many
names can be said of God, but also to show how this issue is related to the

